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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff-Appellant (hereafter "Duncan"), has appealed the Memorandum Opinion and 
Orderon Motion to Dismiss and PetitionforJudicial Review entered by District Court Judge Kerrick 
on September 3, 2008. Said court affirmed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final 
Order entered by the Defendant-Respondent Idaho State Board of Accountancy on August 16,2007, 
in which the Idaho StateBoardof Accountancy sanctionedDuncan for violating AICPARule 102.3. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A Verified Complaint was filed against Duncan with the Idaho State Board of Accountancy 
(hereafter "Board") on September 22,2006. On July 18,2007 a hearing was held before a Hearing 
Body of the Board (hereafter "Hearing Body") regarding said Complaint. At the hearing, the Board 
alleged that Duncan violated Rule 102.03 of the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct. 
The following undisputed and uncontroverted facts are pertinent to this Appeal: 
Duncan has been licensed in the State of Idaho as a CPA since 1986. 
Duncan has never had a complaint filed against him previously nor has he ever been 
disciplined for professional misconduct. 
Beginning in 2001, Duncan's firm prepared the tax returns for the Complainant and his then 
wife Evelyn. Duncan never gave the Complaint and Evelyn financial advise. 
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I actually prepared the 2003 tax return 
As of April 28,2004, the 2003 tax return was substantially completed. No work was done 
on the return until August 11,2004 (a second extension was filed on that date). 
Sometime in the first part of May of 2004, Evelyn called Duncan requesting a referral to an 
attorney who could handle a divorce for her. 
Sometime later in May or early June of 2004, Duncan and Evelyn developed a personal 
relationship. 
On June 29,2004, Evelyn filed for divorce against the complainant. 
Both parties were represented in the divorce by attorneys. 
On August 11,2004, the decree of divorce was entered. 
On August 11,2004, a second extension was filed by Duncan's firm for the Complainant and 
Evelyn's 2003 tax return. 
On August 13, 2004, Duncan informed the Complainant that he would no longer be 
performing his accounting services. 
On August 18, 2004, Complainant acknowledged that he was aware of the reIationship 
between Duncan and Evelyn. 
Sometime after the decree of divorce was entered, Evelyn requested that the 2003 tax return 
be completed. 
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Pursuant to instructions, the 2003 tax return was completed with the Complainant's attorney 
as the taxpayer's address (with the exception of the extension filed on August 11,2004, no work had 
been performed on said return since April 28,2004). . 
On or around September 14, 2004, the Claimant either picked up or had delivered the 2003 
tax return. 
Both Evelyn and the Complainant signed the 2003 tax return. 
The 2003 tax return was filed by Evelyn and the Complainant. 
The Complaint received and kept the refund that he and Evelyn received as a result of the 
filed 2003 tax return. 
There has not been any negative allegations regarding the 2003 tax return prepared by 
Duncan's firm. 
On August 16,2007, the Hearing Body issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Final Order. The Hearing Body made the following factual findings: 
. Duncan did not make a disclosure to the Complainant-spouse that he had a conflict of 
interest that prevented him from continuing to represent both parties in tax preparation. He 
did not seek the consent of either party to continue such representation. Duncan stated that 
tax preparation was completed in a client neutral manner. 
. Duncan continued to retain responsibility for the filing of joint tax returns for both clients. 
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. Complainant was aware of the personal relationship that was established between Duncan 
and Evelyn and was antagonistic toward both Duncan and Evelyn. 
. AICPA Rule 102.03 does not create an exception from the duty to disclose a conflict of 
interest and seek consent to continuation of the professional services relationship for the 
situation in which the client is aware of the relationship. 
(R. pp. 11-12). 
The Hearing Body then made the following conclusions of law: 
. If an individual licensed by the Board of Accountancy establishes a personal intimate 
relationship with one spouse and a relationship of antagonism with the other spouse, one may 
reasonably view the relationships to impair the member's objectivity. 
. If an individual licensed by the Board of Accountancy believes the professional service can 
be performed wit11 objectivity, and the relationship is disclosed to the client(s) and consent 
of the client(s) is obtained, AICPA 102.3 does not prohibit the performance of the 
professional service. 
. Duncan had a duty to terminate the professional relationship or to make disclosure of a 
conflict of interest to both clients due to the divorce proceedings and finalization of the 
divorce or the personal relationship that was established between Duncan and one client. 
Duncan did not make such required disclosures and did not seek the consent of either client 
prior to continuation of the professional services relationship. 
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. Duncan violated the Idaho Accountancy Act, Idaho Code § 54-219(1)(d), specifically Idaho 
Accountancy Rule 004.01 by not making the disclosures or seekingreceiving the consent(s) 
required by AICPA 102.3. 
(R. pp. 12-13). 
Subsequently Duncan filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review. On September 3,2008, 
the District Court affirmed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order entered by 
the Board on August 16,2007, in which the Board sanctioned Duncan for violating AICPA Rule 
102.3. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the District Court err in not overturning the Idaho StateBoardof Accountancy's decision 
that the Appellant violated the Idaho Accountancy Act, specifically Idaho Accountancy Rule 004.01, 
by not making the disclosures or seekinglreceiving the consent(s) required by AICPA 102.3, when: 
(a) AICPA 102.3 is silent about who needs to make a disclosure of a relationship and 
how the disclosure of that relationship is to be made and the uncontrovertable 
evidence in the recordestablished that the Complainant was aware of the relationship 
requiring disclosure prior to the finalization of the tax return; and 
(b) AICPA 102.3 is silent about how consent must be obtained and the uncontrovertable 
evidence in the record established that all parties consented to the Appellant 
continuing to provided professional services, including the Complainant who got a 
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copy of final tax return, signed the final tax return, filed the final tax return, kept the 
refund, and never alleged that the professional services provided by the Appellant 
where in any way suspect. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT OVERTURNING THE BOARD'S DECISION 
THAT DUNCAN VIOLATED AICPA 102.3 BY ERRONEOUSLY GIVING THE BOARD'S 
UNREASONABLE CONSTRUCTION OF AICPA 102.3 WEIGHT BY AFFIRMLNG A 
DECISION THAT IS NOT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND IS 
ARBlTRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BASED ON THE BOARD'S 
UNREASONABLE CONSTRUCTION OF AICPA 102.3 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Judicial review of an agency action is governed by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. 
See I.C. $ 67-5270. A reviewing court must overturn the agency's decision if it determines that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(h) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; ox 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
See I.C. $ 67-5279. The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as 
to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. See I.C. $67-5279. When a District Court acts 
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in its appellate capacity under the APA, the Supreme Court reviews the agency record independently 
of the District Court's decision. Sons & Daughters of ldaho, Inc. v. ldaho Lottery Comm'n, 144 
Idaho 23,26,156 P.3d 524, 527 (2007). 
A reviewing must give considerable weight to an agency's construction of a statute 01 
administrative rule or regulation only if the agency's interpretation is reasonable. See Preston v. 
Idaho State Tax Comm'n , 131 Idaho 502,504,960 P.2d 185, 187 (1998) (Emphasis added.) 
Administrative regulations are subject to the same principles of statutory construction as statutes. 
Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581,586,21 P.3d 903,908 (2001). Interpretation of such a rule 
should begin, therefore, with an examination of the literal words of the rule. Id. at 586,21 P.3d at 
908. The language of the rule, like the language of a statute, should be given its plain, obvious and 
rational meaning. Id. at 586,21 P.3d at 908. 
B. THE HEARING BODY UNREASONABLY CONSTRUES THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
AICPA 102.3 AND THUS ITS INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE GIVEN NO WEIGm. 
On a preliminary matter, the underlying basis for this appeal is that the Hearing Body 
unreasonably constructs AICPA 102.3 in its application to this matter. The language of AICPA 
102.3 is very clear and straightforward on what needs to be done if professional services are to be 
continued. Rule 102.03 of the AICPA states in pertinent that: 
A conflict of interest may occur if a member performs a professional service for a 
client or employer and the member or his firm has arelationship with another person, 
entity, product, or service that could, in the member's professional judgment, be 
viewed by the client, employer, or other appropriate parties as impairing the 
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member's objectivity. If the member believes that the professional service can 
be performed with objectivity, and the relationship is disclosed to and consent 
is obtained from such client, employer, or other appropriate parties, the rule 
shall not operate to prohibit the performance of the professional service. When 
making the disclosure, the member should consider Rule 301. 
(Emphasis added.) What needs to be done if professional services are to be continued is that (1) the 
relationship needs to be disclosed, and (2) that consent be obtained. What is critical to note is that 
AICPA 102.3 is silent about who needs to disclose therelationship, that AICPA 102.3 is silent about 
how the disclosure of the relationship needs to be made, i.e. whether it can be made orally or must 
be in writing, and is silent on how consent must be obtained. As the Court knows, not only can 
consent can be express as well as implied, there is no legal or practical difference between the two. 
Nevertheless, AICPA 102.3 is silent about how disclosure and consent is to be made. The drafters 
of AICPA 102.3 obviously had every opportunity to address how disclosure and consent is to be 
made but opted to be silent. As such, one can only reasonably conclude that the drafters were only 
concerned with having disclosure and consent, and were not concerned with how disclosure and 
consent were obtained. The language of the rule must be given its plain, obvious and rational 
meaning. 
In this matter, the Hearing Body concluded that Duncan himself had a duty to terminate the 
professional relationship or that Duncan himself had a duty to make disclosure of a conflict of 
interest to both clients due to the divorce proceedings and finalization of the divorce or that Duncan 
himself had a duty to make a disclosure of the personal relationship that was established between 
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Duncan and one client. The language of AICPA 102.3 does not require that Duncan himself was 
required to disclose the relationship and is silent about how consent is to be obtained. The Hearing 
Body ignores the plain language of AICPA 102.3 and adds adhtional requirements that are not found 
in the rule. Construction of AICPA 102.3 dictates that the language of the rule must be given its 
plain, obvious and rational meaning. The Hearing Body adds requirements to the rule that are not 
found in the clear and unambiguous language of the rule and thus its construction of AICPA 102.3 
is unreasonable and should be given no weight. The District Court erred in giving the Hearing 
Body's construction of AICPA 102.3 weight in affirming the Hearing Body's decision. 
The Hearing Body concluded that Duncan did not make such required disclosures and did 
not seek the consent of either client prior to continuation of the professional services relationship. 
Based on these conclusions, the Hearing Body ruled that Duncan violated AICPA 102.3. The 
Hearing Body unreasonably construed the requirements of AICPA 102.3 and ignored the 
uncontradicted facts of this case which establish that Duncan complied with the requirements of 
AICPA 102.3. 
C. THE RELATIONSHIPS WERE PROPERLY DISCLOSED IN THIS MATTER. 
The Hearing Body held that Duncan had the duty to terminate the professional relationship 
or to make a disclosure of a conflict of interest to both clients due to the divorce proceeding and 
finalization of the divorce. It is important to note that the Hearing Body cites to the following 
comment of AICPA 102.3 in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order: 
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A member has provided tax or personal financial planning (PTP) service for a 
married couple who are undergoing a divorce, and the member has been asked to 
provide the services for both parties during the divorce proceedings. 
Contrary to the Hearing Body's holding, as set forth above, AICPA 102.3 does not require 
that aconflict of interest be disclosed, AICPA 102.3 requires only that the relationship be disclosed. 
With regards to the filing and ultimate divorce of the Complainant and Evelyn in this matter, this 
relationship obviously had been disclosed. The Complainant and Evelyn knew that they were in 
divorce proceedings. Furthermore, the comment to AICPA 102.3 that the Hearing Body relies upon 
does not even apply to this matter. The comment addresses tax or personal financial planning 
service, not tax preparation. There is a significant difference between tax preparation, which is what 
Duncan's firm did, and tax or personal financial planning. The lax preparation that occurred in this 
case was limited to the events and consequences that occurred in the calendar year of 2002. Events 
and consequences that cannot be changed. The fact that the Complainant and Evelyn were 
undergoing a divorce in 2003 has no bearing on the tax events that occurred in 2002. The return that 
Duncan's firm prepared would have been prepared exactly the same way regardless of whether the 
Complainant and Evelyn were happily married or going through a divorce. Finally Duncan never 
gave the Complainant and Evelyn financial or tax planning advice, Duncan's firm merely provided 
tax preparation services. 
Another critical point is that the return was substantially completed before Evelyn even 
contacted Duncan about a referral to an attorney for a divorce. Additionally, no substantive work 
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was done on the return during the time period that the Evelyn contacted Duncan about arefenal until 
the divorce was final between the Complainant and Evelyn. While an extension was filed on the day 
that the decree was entered, this event has no substantive effect on the retum, in fact, failing to file 
an extension arguably would have been professional malpractice by the Duncan's finn. 
The Hearing Body's conclusion that the Petitioner should have disclosed the conflict of 
interest due to the divorce proceedings is unreasonable. AICPA 102.3 only requires that the 
relationship be disclosed, and in this case the parties obviously knew they were getting a divorce. 
Furthermore, AICPA 102.3 does not even apply to tax preparation in this case. The return would 
have been prepared exactly the same regardless of the relationship status between the Complainant 
and Evelyn. Finally, no work was done on the retum from the time that Duncan learned about the 
possibility of a divorce until the divorce was final. It is ridiculous to sanction a professional for a 
time period in which he was not even performing services. 
The Hearing Body also held that Duncan had the duty to terminate the professional 
relationship or to make a disclosure of a conflict of interest to both clients due to the personal 
relationship that was established between Duncan and one client. AICPA 102.3 does not require that 
a conflict of interest be disclosed. AICPA quite clearly states that the only thing that needs to be 
disclosed is the relationship itself - not the conflict of interest. AICPA 102.3 is silent about who 
needs to disclose the relationship, AICPA 102.3 is silent about how the disclosure of the relationship 
needs to be-made, i.e. whether it can be made orally or must be in writing. The facts of this case 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -11- 
W OFFICES OF 
CLARK A N D  FEENEY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
establish that the Complainant acknowledged that he knew about the relationship between Duncan 
and Evelyn before the Complaint received the return, knew about the relationship before he signed 
the return, knew about the relationship before he mailed the return, and knew about the relationship 
before he accepted the refund from the return. The Hearing Body interprets that AICPA 102.3 
requires Duncan himself to disclose the relationship. AICPA 102.3 makes no such requirement. The 
only requirement is that the relationship be disclosed and in this case the Complainant knew about 
the relationship between Duncan and Evelyn and thus the language of AICPA 102.3 was satisfied. 
The Hearing Body made a factual finding that AICPA 102.03 does not create an exception 
from the duty to disclose a conflict of interest and seek consent to continuation of the professional 
services relationship for the situation in which the client is aware of the relationship. Such a 
"finding" is not actually a factual finding but a conclusion of law, and regardless is unreasonable. 
AICPA 102.3 only requires that the reIationship be disclosed and is silent about who must disclose 
the relationship. In this case the Complainant expressly acknowledged that he knew about the 
relation prior to his receipt of the tax return and as such, the Hearing Body's holding that the 
Petitioner violated AICPA 102.3 is contrary to the clear and unambiguous language of the rule and 
ignores the uncontradicted facts in this matter. The District Court erred in giving the Hearing Body's 
construction of AICPA 102.3 weight in affirming the Hearing Body's decision which was not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record and based on its unreasonable construction of AICPA 
102.3 was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
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D. BOTH CLIENTS CONSENTED TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICE RELATIONSHIP. 
To support its holding that Duncan violated AICPA 102.3, the Hearing Body determined that 
Duncan did not seek the consent of the Complainant and Evelyn to continue offering professional 
services. Again AICPA 102.3 is silent about how consent must be obtained and the facts of this case 
establish that both parties consented to Duncan's firm preparing the tax return. 
As set forth above, disclosure of any relationship was satisfied in accordance to AICPA 
102.3. Not only was any relationship properly disclosed, consent was obtained after the disclosure. 
Obviously the Complainant and Evelyn knew they were going through a divorce and the Complaint 
knew about the relationship between Duncan and Evelyn before he received the return. After the 
divorce was final, Evelyn requested that the return be completed - such a request clearly includes 
consent. With regards to the Complainant, he either picked up or had delivered the return after the 
divorce was final and after he knew about the relationship between Duncan and Evelyn. After all 
of this he got the return, signed it, filed it, and kept the refund. There is no way that the Complainant 
would have done any of this had he not consented to Duncan's firm completing the return. 
It is important to note that the Complainant was represented by an attorney during the 
divorce. In fact, after the divorce was final, the Complainant directed that the tax payer's address 
on the return be changed to his attorney's address. If the Complainant did not consent to Duncan's 
firm preparing the return, he could have chosen not to get the return, not to sign the return, not to file 
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the return, not to keep the refund, and not have the address changed to his attorney's address. The 
Complainant not only consented to Duncan's firm's services, he accepted the benefits of said 
services. 
The Hearing Body's concluded that Duncan did not seek the consent of the Complainant or 
Evelyn to the continuation of professional services. This conclusion is unreasonable given the clear 
and unambiguous language of AICPA 102.03 which requires consent but does not dictate how 
consent must be obtained. Evelyn requested that Duncan's firm finish the return and the 
Complainant received the return, signed it, filed it, and accepted the benefits. Clearly both parties 
consented. The District Court erred in giving the Hearing Body's construction of AICPA 102.3 
weight in affirming the Hearing Body's decision which was not supported by substantial evidence 
in the record and based on its unreasonable construction of AICPA 102.3 was arbitrary, capricious, 
or an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
AICPA 102.3 clearly requires that disclosure of therelationship and consent must be obtained 
if a conflict of interest exists. However, just as clearly, AICPA 102.3 is silent about how disclosure 
and consent must be obtained. The clear and unambiguous language of the rule places no obligation 
on Duncan himself to make the disclosure and makes no mention on how consent is to be obtained. 
In this case, all disclosures were made and all consents were given. That is what the rule requires 
and that is what happened in this case. 
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The Hearing Body's conclusion and subsequent order that the Petitioner violated AICPA 
102.3 is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and also is arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion given its unreasonable construction of AICPA 102.3. The 
District Court erred in giving the Hearing Body's construction of AICPA 102.3 weight in affirming 
the Hearing Body's decision which was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and 
based on its unreasonable construction of AICPA 102.3 was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. 
The Hearing Body's decision in this matter is not based on the plain and clear language of 
AICPA 102.3. Its decision is based on what it perceives the rule to require. The board's perception 
of the rule is not what is controlling, what is controlling are the facts coupled with the language of 
the rule and in this case the facts establish that the Petitioner was not in violation of the rule. 
An extremely troubling aspect of this matter is that there has never been an allegation, nor 
a finding, that the tax return was prepared in any other way than it should have been. So in effect 
what the Hearing Body is doing is punishing Duncan for providng a professional prepared tax 
return, a tax return whose substantive preparation is beyond reproach, for not complying with 
provisions of AICPA 102.3 that are not actually in the rule. So really what the Hearing Body is 
actually saying is that Duncan is being sanctioned not because his work was suspect, and not 
because of the plain language of AICPA 102.3, but because he did not comply with what it believes 
to be the requirements of AICPA 102.3. 
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Quite frankly the Hearing Body's decision to sanction Duncan is not based on AICPA 102.3 
because this rule has not been violated in this matter. As set forth above, the appropriate disclosures 
and consents were obtained in accordance to the requirements of AICPA 102.3. The Hearing 
Body's decision to sanction Duncan is based on its own opinion that Duncan should be sanctioned 
for the events that transpired and justifies this opinion by interpreting AICPA 102.3 in a manner 
inconsistent with the plain language and meaning of the rule. As such, the Hearing Body's 
conclusion and subsequent order that Duncan violated AICPA 102.3 is not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole and also is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion given 
its unreasonable construction of AICPA 102.3 and thus the District Court erred in affirming the 
Hearing Body's decision. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 2009. 
CLARK AND FBENEY 
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